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Crafting Defense R&D Policy in the
Anti-Terrorist Era
Manuel Trajtenberg, Tel Aviv University, NBER,and CEPR
Executive Summary
This paper seeks to analyze the nature of theterrorist threat following Septem-
ber 11, 2001, and to explore the implicationsfor defense R&D policy. First, it
reviews the defining trends of defense R&D sincethe Cold War and brings in
pertinent empirical evidence. During the 1990s,the United States accumulated
a defense R&D stock ten times largerthan any other country and almost thirty
times larger than Russia. Big weapons systems,key during the Cold War but
of dubious significance since then, still figureprominently, commanding 30
percent of current defense R&D spending,vis-à-vis just about 13 percent for
intelligence and anti-terrorism. The second part ofthe paper examines the
nature of the terrorist threat, focusing onthe role of uncertainty, the lack of
deterrence, and the extent to which security againstterrorism is (still) a public
good. Drawing from a formal model of terrorismthat I developed elsewhere
(Trajtenberg 2003), I explore these and related issues infurther detail. Two
strategies for confronting terrorism are considered:fighting terrorism at its
source and protecting individual targets(the latter entails a negative exter-
nality). Contrary to the traditidnal case ofnational defense, security against
terrorism becomes a mixed private/publicgood. A key result of the model is
that the government should spend enough onfighting terrorism at its source
to nullify the incentives of private targets toinvest in their own security. Intelli-
gence emerges as the key aspectof the war against terrorism, and accordingly
R&D aimed at providing advancedtechnological means for intelligence is
viewed as the cornerstone of defense R&D. Thisentails developing computer-
ized sensory interfaces and increasing the ability toanalyze vast amounts of
data. Both have direct civilian applications,and therefore the required R&D
is mostly "dual use." Indeed, there is already aprivate market for these sys-
tems, with a large number of players.R&D programs designed to preserve this
diversity and to encourage further competition may provebeneficial both for
the required R&D and for the economy at large.2 Trajtenberg
I.Introduction
The devastating terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, and their after-
math pose a formidable challenge to U.S. nationalsecurity and call for
the rethinking of established dogma ina wide range of fields. The at-
tacks came after a relatively peaceful decade thatconstituted an inter-
lude between the Cold War and the emergingterrorist threat. Defense
R&D had proceeded over the postWorld War II decadesalong the
familiar path of the arms race in the nuclearage, bounded only by
treaties that sought to mitigate the spiraling costs andpreserve the
logic of the "mutually assured destruction" doctrine.This coincided
with a golden era of scientific and technologicalprogress, unleashing
extraordinary advances in military technology.1 The collapseof the So-
viet Union, brought about in part by thatsame race, left the United
States as the only superpower, particularly interms of its edge in mili-
tary technology. The new terrorist threat negated much of thatadvan-
tage, however, because the enemy could neither be effectivelydeterred
by overwhelming military force, nor could it bedestroyed by actually
deploying that force. In the meantime, defense R&Dcontinued by and
large along the old path, still devoting largeamounts of resources to
the development of big, complex offensiveweapons systems that have
no rival in the world and for which there is no clear threat that these
costly weapons could forestall. A fresh look at defenseR&D policy is
thus called for, starting from a thorough analysis of thenew terrorist
threat and seeking to trace its implications for therequired R&D. The
main goal of this paper is to deploy some basic tools ofeconomic analy-
sis to this much-needed reassessment.
Section II characterizes in detail defense R&D beforeSeptember 11,
2001, bringing in data to bear bothon the total stock of military R&D
of the United States vis-â-vis other leadingcountries and on the compo-
sition of R&D spending. Simple computations ofthe defense R&D
stock generated during the 1990s indicate that duringthat decade alone
the United States accumulated a stock ten timesas large as that of any
other country, and almost thirty times larger than its old foe,Russia.
Within this vast technological reservoir, bigweapons systems still fig-
ure prominently, commanding about 30 percent of current R&D spend-
ing (not including the ballistic missile defenseprogram, which
commands another 15 percent). On the other hand, R&D aimedat intel-
ligence and anti-terrorism, which the analysis belowplaces at the fore-
front of the desirable defense R&D policy,constitute only about 13
percent of the known total.Crafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 3
Section ifi examines the nature of the terroristthreat, focusing on
the role of uncertainty, the lack of deterrence,and the extent to which
providing security against terrorism is still a publicgood. This latter
issue receives a more detailed treatment inSection 1V, where I bring
in insights from a formal model of terrorismthat I developed elsewhere
(Trajtenberg 2003). The building blocks are cast in termsof the proba-
bility that a terrorist attack will take place and the(conditional) proba-
bility that any particular target will be hit. Twostrategies are available
to combat terrorism. The first consistsof fighting terrorism at its source,
thus reducing the overall probability that an attackwill take place; this
constitutes a public good and hence is to beprovided by the govern-
ment. The second entails potential targetsinvesting in their own secu-
rity, thus reducing the probability that theywill be hit but raising it
for others (a negative externality). Contrary tothe traditional case of
national defense, the provision of security against terrorismthus be-
comes a mixed private/publicgood. A key result of the model is that
the government should spend enough onfighting terrorism at its
source to nullify the incentivesof private targets to invest in their own
(local) security. The model also allows explorationof the relative im-
pact of R&D aimed at improving theeffectiveness of spending on each
type of strategy.
Section V attempts to draw implications for thedesign of a coherent
defense R&D policy that would fit the changing natureof the threats
facing the United States, and in particular thecharacterization of the
terrorist threat as discussed in Sections III to IV.Intelligence (in the
broad sense) emerges as the key aspect of the waragainst terrorism,
and thus R&D aimed at providing advancedtechnological means for
improved intelligence is viewed as the cornerstoneof defense R&D.
Basic R&D for target-specific protection fromterrorist threats, R&D to
counter nonconventional threats, and cybersecurity are additional im-
portant aspects of such policy.
Section VI looks into the technological directionsimplied by the re-
quired anti-terrorist R&D and the implications forcompetition in the
relevant markets. The provision of advanced meansfor intelligence
and for target protection entails emulating human sensoryperceptions
through computerized sensory interfaces and increasingdramatically
the ability to analyze in real time vast amountsof information. Both
have clear and direct civilian applications, andtherefore the required
R&D is mostly "dual use." The development of big weaponssystems
during the Cold War led to a high concentrationof both R&D and
procurement into a few large corporations,conferring on them a great4 Trajtenberg
deal of market power. By contrast, the development ofsensory com-
puter interfaces, Internet security, biological protection, and the like,
entails an entirely different playing field. As stated already,these sys-
tems are dual use. There is (also) a private market for them, andthere
exists already a large number of players thatcan partake in the re-
quired R&D. New R&D programs could be designedto preserve this
much needed diversity and toencourage further competition. Such
programs may prove highly beneficial both for the required defense
R&D and for the advanced sectors of theeconomy themselves, thus
fostering economic growth. Section VII concludes witha summary of
the principles upon which defense R&D policy for theanti-terrorist era
could be articulated.
II.Defense R&D: Before and After September 11, 20012
Since the 1950s and up to the 1990s, the predominantsecurity threat
facing the United States was ofcourse that posed by the former Soviet
Union, a threat that led to a relentlessarms race. The main goal of
the U.S. military was, accordingly, to deter the former SovietUnion
from attacking the United Statesor its allies (primarily western Eu-
rope), and if attacked, to be able to defeatany combination of threaten-
ing states (i.e., including the Warsaw pact members).3 DefenseR&D
thus had very clear goals, there wasa well-defined (leading) foe, and
the rules of the game were also well defined, evolving ratherslowly
throughout the dynamic interaction with the former SovietUnion.4
This led to the building of a formidable defense R&D complex,includ-
ing DARPA, federal labs (such as Livermore, Argonne,and Oak
Ridge), large private contractors (suchas Lockheed, Grumman, and
Raytheon), research at major universities (suchas MIT and Stanford),
and the R&D performed at the various branches of the militaryitself.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, thisvast com-
plex developed ever more powerful and accurateweapons, and in par-
ticular big weapons systems suchas nuclear devices, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, large carriers,high-performing
aircraft (including jet fighters, large transport planes, combatand trans-
port helicopters, and stealth aircraft), and so forth.5 The logic of the
Cold War arms race dictated to a large extent the direction of R&D.For
example, the prevalent mutually assured destruction (MAD)doctrine
necessitated the development of nuclear subs that could survive and
operate autonomously even after a devastating nuclear attackon theCrafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 5
mainland United States and deliver a retaliatory blow onthe enemy.
Conversely, various treaties with the former Soviet Unionlimited the
development of antiballistic missiles.6
Fortunately for all involved, the logic of the MAD doctrine worked
well, and the immense arsenal of highly sophisticated andlethal weap-
ons (in particular the big weaponssystems) developed during the Cold
War remained for the most part unutilized. A relentless arms race ter-
minated without a major confrontation, essentially by theinternal (but
not unrelated) collapse of one of the contenders.However, the enor-
mous R&D resources poured intothe development of those weapons
systems over decades did achieve their goal: todeter a major armed
conflict. In that sense, the relative peace in which the Americanpeople
and most of the world lived for half a century owes as much todefense
R&D as to anything else.
The collapse of the former Soviet Union shattered thebasic premises
that had guided defense R&D primarily because afoe having commen-
surate capabilities and racing for parity or supremacy nolonger ex-
isted. Thus, attention gradually shifted away from the prospectof an
all-out war to regional conflicts in which the United States mayhave
a stake as well as to issues stemminglargely from the split-up of the
Soviet Union, such as preventing nuclear leakage. A commondenomi-
nator of these new challenges was that the mighty deterrencebuilt over
the decades of the Cold War was no longer effective, if onlybecause
the United States could not conceivably resort to anuclear strike
against foes that did not pose a commensurate threat tothe United
States itself. Defense R&D was thus to serve newgoals, such as the
ability to fight simultaneously two regional conflicts(emphasizing
rapid deployment, maintainability of equipment, etc.) and tominimize
casualties in any confrontation (one of the legacies from theVietnam
War). Yet throughout the 1990s, a big chunk of defenseR&D was still
devoted to big weapons systems, such as the development of newhigh-
performing and extremely expensive aircraft. Indeed, andperhaps not
surprisingly, defense R&D exhibited a large degree of inertia,partly
as a consequence of the fact thatR&D expenses grow rapidly as a proj-
ect moves forward from basic research towarddevelopment, testing,
and evaluation. Thus, "legacy" projects that wereconceived a decade
or more earlier proceeded toabsorb increasing R&D resources over
time, even though the need for them had almostvanished.
Much as the fall of the Soviet Union over a decade earliermarked
the closing of an era, September 11, 2001, signified the beginningof a6 Trajtenberg
new one, one dominated by the worldwide terrorist threat (see Hoge
and Rose 2002). Of course, large-scale terrorism against the United
States did not start with the attack on the World Trade Center(WTC)
and the Pentagon; the devastating attackon the U.S. marine barracks
in Beirut in 1983, the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobiand in
Dar es Salaam in 1998, and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October2000
were painful indications of the evolving new threat. Yet September 11,
2001, was qualitatively different because it was the first large-scaleat-
tack on the homeland, an attack ofa far larger magnitude than any-
thing done before. Indeed, September 11, 2001,was the equivalent of
a declaration of war, of total war, on the United States. It was a declara-
tion of war by a diffused, amorphous enemy who didnot put forward
a clear set of demands, or even a well-defined set of grievances that
could be negotiated away, or mitigated. The nature of the threatand
the accompanying challenge to the United States securityare thus un-
precedented.
The shock caused by September 11, 2001,can be seen as a combina-
tion of Pearl Harbor and Sputnik: a surprise attack resulting in initial
stunning losses, the revelation of an unbearable degree of vulnerability,
the birth of a major new threat to national security, and the dearthof
technological means to face it effectively. The latter is the keyto the
redesign of a coherent defense R&D policy becausewe have once again
a well-defined goal, namely, the development of the scientific and tech-
nological infrastructure to serve the long-termwar against terrorism.
This goal has far-reaching implications in terms of the directionof the
defense R&D, and if pursued forcefully, it would representa significant
departure from the kind of R&D done until September 11, 2001. Before
analyzing in more detail what the war on terrorism requires, it isim-
portant to note what is not needed in this new era, thus suggestinga
policy that involves primarily a re-allocation of existingresources
rather than increased expenditures.
Defense R&D Stocks
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there isno country (or plau-
sible coalition of countries) that can challenge the present technological
supremacy of the U.S. military.7 Indeed, the defense R&D stock of the
United States, developed and accumulatedover the past decades, is
far larger than that of any country in the world.8 The only othersizable
stock was that of the former Soviet Union, but that has shrunk dramati-Crafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era. 7
Table 1.1
Defense R&D stock as of 2000 (in billions of constant 1998 $U.S.)a
'The data used in these computations are given inappendix 1.1. Note that there is a
significant degree of uncertainty regarding some of thesedata, particularly for Russia.
Thus, these figures should be taken as indicative only. Tocompute the stocks, I simply
apply the following formula:,0D1991+(1 - r)9_t, where D1991+denotes defense R&D
expenditures in year 1991 + t.
cally after the collapse, and Russia cannotafford to renew it.9 Japan
has severe built-in constraints on spendingfor defense R&D, making
it a noncontender for the foreseeablefuture. Western Europe has ad-
vanced technological capabilities but has spentless than the United
States for the past decades and, barring adramatic geopolitical change,
it will continue its spending rate in thefuture.
To gain an idea of the actualmagnitudes involved, I computed the
defense R&D stocks generated duringthe decade of the 1990s (1991-
2000) for the G8 countries that have hadsignificant military R&D in-
vestments.1° These are not the total stocks available butonly the portion
added during the 1990s. These countries(particularly the United
States) had substantial defense R&D stocks prior tothat decade, which
were generated duringthe long decades of the Cold War. As table 1.1
reveals, during the 1990s, the United Statesaccumulated an additional
defense R&D stock over ten times as high as the nextlargest (the United
Kingdom, if we use a depreciation rate of 15percent), twenty-eight
times that of Russia, and over three timesthat of the other countries
combined. These differences are stunning andgive a quantitative
sense of the technological supremacyof the United States referred to
above.
Some qualifications to these computations arein order. First, table
1.1 quite likely overstates the actualtechnological gap between the
United States and its allies because theUnited States exports to them
military equipment embedding technologicaladvances achieved by
Stocks based on a depreciation rate of:
G8 countries 15% 5%
United States 197.23 301.64




Russia 7.14 11.068 Trajtenberg
the R&D that goes into these stocks, andsome of the R&D projects are
joint with them. On the other hand, the extent ofunderreporting of
defense R&D (due to secrecytheseare the so-called "black pro-
grams") is likely to be significantly higher in the UnitedStates than in
western Europe. Second, there are likely to be spillovers andleakages
from the defense R&D done in the United States thatenhance the tech-
nological capabilities of other countries. It is hardto believe, however,
that these qualifications would alter significantlythe picture that
emerges from table 1.1.
Beyond the advanced nations, China is perhapsthe only emerging
power that may be a source of concern. A simple calculation indicates,
however, that the possibility of China posinga serious challenge to the
defense R&D advantage of the United Statesis rather unlikely. The
United States spends about 0.4 percentage pointsof its GDP on defense
R&D. China's GDP is about one-tenth that of theUnited States; thus,
to match the U.S. current level of spending, China wouldhave to allo-
cate a staggering 4 percent of its GDP to defense R&D andmaintain
that level for many years, a rather far-fetched scenario.11Furthermore,
matching on a current basis woulderase the initial huge advantage of
the United States only in thevery long run. Essentially, the vastly larger
economic resources of the United States vis-à-visany other nation, and
the fact that it already possessesa huge stock of military R&D, gives
the United States an unmatched technological advantagethat cannot
be challenged unless a dramatic geopolitical changeoccurs. Even if that
were the case, however, the United States would still have significant
margins of time (and resources) to respond.
The Composition of Defense R&D
How much does the United States invest in R&D aimedat big weapons
systems versus other technological means that could help confrontcur-
rent threats to national security? To address this issue, Iexamine in
detail the composition of the defense R&D budget forfiscal years 2001
to 2003. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
publishes a document called "RDT&E Programs" thatcontains almost
800 budget items, indicating theagency in charge, the type of program,
the program name, and the allocated budget. (Seeappendix 1.2 for a
list of the top twenty items in the list.) With the aidof expert officers
of the Israeli air force, we managed to classify 369of the 798 itemsCrafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 9






Mmiscellaneous (i.e., not classified elsewhere)
By "big weapons systems," I mean traditional, large, complex weap-
ons systems having mostly an offensivecharacter, such as jet fighters,
ICBMs, carriers, nuclear submarines, and the like. We created a sepa-
rate category for ballistic missile defense, because these aredefensive
systems that are relatively new and meant to respond to presentand
future threats posed by the proliferation of long-range missiletechnol-
ogies in potentially hostile states. In case of doubt between"B" and
"M," we opted for "M" to prevent biasing the totals in favor of the
argument put forward here. Intelligence is almost certainly underrep-
resented in these data, if ordy because the funding of the Directorate
of Science and Technology of the CIA is not included in these figures
(as far as I know). The "T" category is almost surely understated as
well because it is very hard to discern what exactly qualifies as "anti-
terrorism." As it stands now, it includes all items related to chemical
and biological warfare,'3 and a few others.14 The newly created Depart-
ment of Homeland Security presumably commandsadditional budgets
for anti-terrorism-related R&D that are not included in ourfigures.
"Miscellaneous" means "not classified elsewhere"; that is, it is the de-
fault category for all items that do not clearly belong into one of the
others. Significant margins of error likely remain in the classification
performed, and intelligence and anti-terrorism, in particular, are quite
certainly downward biased; however, I hope that the summary results
presented in tables 1.2 and 1.3 are still informative and in the right
ballpark.
As tables 1.2 and 1.3 reveal, about 30 percent of the reported defense
R&D is (still) allocated to big weapons systems. This category includes
the development of systems that have no rival in the world, and it is
not clear what sort of security threats these costly weapons are meant
to forestall. The prime example is the F-22, a kind oftechnological mar-
vel. It is an extremely expensive aircraft, with projected capabilities10 Trajtenberg
Table 1.2
Distribution of defense R&D: 2001-2003 (current thousand $)
'The total amounts here are lower than the total defense R&D budgets by about 10 to
15 percent. Defense-related R&D done by other government agencies (such as NIH) is
not included; there are other, apparently classified items not reported in the published
list, and some of the items listed in the cited document have not been assigneda dollar
amount.
Table 1.3
Distribution of defense R&D: 2001-2003 (percentages)
beyond what could be regarded as real needs that current jet fighters
could not appropriately fulfill.15 On the other hand, intelligence and
anti-terrorism command only about 10 to 13 percent of the budget.16
As I argue later, even if the true figures are significantly higher than
these, the percentage allocated to these key activities is still quite low,
relative to their present and future importance for national security.
Therefore, it seems that the dramatic shift in the nature of the threats
to national security since September 11, 2001, have had little impact so
far on the composition of R&D, and that calls for a prompt revision.
One mitigating factor, however, may simply be time. Even if policy
priorities shift, it takes a while to implement the desired changes, and
in particular, it takes time to launch R&D programs to serve those
changing priorities. As figure 1.1 reveals, it took about threeyears to
Category FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
Big weapons systems 30.40 28.81 30.59
Miscellaneous 34.23 33.93 31.93
Ballistic missile defense 12.16 17.03 15.18
Intelligence 8.35 8.17 9.95
Anti-terrorism 2.13 2.18 3.09
Not classified 12.72 9.87 9.26
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: U.S. Government (2002).
Category FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003
Big weapons systems 10,752,781 11,911,890 13,805,069
Miscellaneous 12,107,023 14,029,675 14,407,247
Ballistic missile defense 4,302,183 7,039,441 6,848,958
Intelligence 2,953,072 3,378,629 4,490,930
Anti-terrorism 754,140 902,937 1,394,472
Not classified 4,497,512 4,081,025 4,178,031








NASA R&D expenditures yearly percentagechanges: 1955-1963.
Source: Mowery and Rosenberg (1989), table 6.12, pp.161-165.
beef up NASA's budget after Sputnikandit has not been three years
yet since September 11, 2001.
III.The Nature of the Terrorist Threat
Present-day terrorism, as manifested most potently onSeptember 11,
2001, and since, poses a very different setof threats than the conven-
tional, nation-against-nation type of conflictsthat have been prevalent
throughout most of history.'7 Confrontingsuch novel threats presents
a formidable challenge atall levels: to the current military, intelligence,
and police capabilities of the target countries; totheir democratic insti-
tutions that need to strike a delicatebalance in pursuing this war; and
also to the scientific and technological resourcesthat need to be mobi-
lized to devise the appropriatetechnological means to combat terror.
The latter requires the design of a coherentand well-articulated R&D
policy, which should be based on thesystematic analysis of the nature
of these threats, in and of themselves,and in contrast to those posed
by conventional conflicts. Thegoal of this section is thus to set the
framework for such analysis and inparticular to try to identify the
distinguishing features of the terrorist threatthat have salient implica-







Let me start with two general points. The firstis that present-day
terrorism is based on and exploits huge asymmetriesbetween the per-
petrators and the victims: asymmetry in the perceivedvalue of life
(leading inter alia to suicidal attacks),asymmetry in the means of com-
bat (relatively simple for terrorists, highly sophisticatedand powerful
for the target countries), asymmetry in theinformation available on
each side (mostly open informationon the potential targets/victims
versus highly secretive, compartmentalized behavior of terrorists),and
so forth. That scenario is not true (for the most part) in conventional
conflicts between countries, and thereforea great deal of the capabili-
ties accumulated in any country in thecourse of contemplating or hav-
ing been engaged in such conflicts,are rendered ineffective for the war
on terror. In particular, many of the weapons systems developed
by the leading industrialized nations during thetwentieth century,
and in particular those developed in thecourse of the Cold War, are
not appropriate for fighting terrorism. Thus, R&D policyin this con-
text will have to depart from established premisesand offer novel
options.
The second observation is thatone cannot expect a clear, decisive
victory in the war on terror that would defeat theenemy once and for
all. Furthermore, in this kind of war there isno possibility of circum-
scribing the contest, the race, with formalagreements or treaties such
as those that were concluded with the former Soviet Union duringthe
Cold War. Therefore, one should proceedon the premise that this will
be a protracted confrontation entailing long-term,persistent threats.
Accordingly, R&D aimed at it should be multilayeredin time, in the
sense of being able to generate technological responses for theshort,
medium, and long term. I turn now tomore specific characteristics of
the terrorist threat: the key role of uncertainty,limited deterrence, and
the private versus public good aspects ofproviding security in this
context.
The Role of Uncertainty
A key feature of the terrorist threat is itsgeneralized, diffused nature,
that is, the large degree of uncertainty regardingwhere, when, and
how terrorists may strike. Such uncertainty iswhat greatly magnifies
the terrorist threat, far beyond what it would taketo confront the ter-
rorists if faced with them or the actual damage thatany single terrorist
strike may cause. Indeed, if the authorities hadadvance knowledge ofCrafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 13
the timing and location of a future attack, actually thwarting it would
be a relatively minor affair involving the deployment of little police or
military power.'9
That is not the scenario in conventional warfare. Confronting, say,
an invasion by a foreign power necessitates vast militarycapabilities,
even if one knows when and where the attack will takeplace. The same
applies to a nuclear confrontation. The MAD doctrine required that
each party had the capability to nearly annihilate the other, regardless
of being able to know in advance the timing and exact targets of an
attack. In other words, the sine qua non to fight a conventional or even
a nuclear war is a powerful army, measured by thestrength and tech-
nological means available to its forces. In the end, conventional and
nuclear wars are decided by the outcome of the actual clash between
the rival armies.2° By contrast, fighting terrorism involves first and fore-
most reducing uncertainty, avoiding surprises. If we knew where, say,
al Qaeda cells are, apprehending or destroying them would be a rela-
tively easy task. Likewise, if we could detect terrorists as they try to
approach or enter a target, then neutralizing them should be the easy
part. Even narrowing down the geographical area and/or the approxi-
mate time of a possible terrorist strike can greatly simplify the task of
thwarting the attack.
The inherent uncertainty of the terrorist threat is also what exerts a
heavy price on the threatened nation, far beyond the actual damage
that may be inflicted once the attack occurs. Individual terrorist acts
or even a series of them may not compromise national security at large,
in the sense of hurting a large proportion of the civilian population,
damaging a significant chunk of the economy, or (to take it to an ex-
treme) posing a danger of losing sovereignty to a foreign power or to
an alien extremist group. And yet the uncertaintyabout when and
where these acts may occur may have far-reaching effects, both in
terms of economic costs (e.g., the provision of security at many poten-
tial targets; reduced investments because of generalized uncertainty;
disruption of travel, tourism, and perhaps also trade) and psychologi-
cal costs (e.g., painful changes in established norms, behaviors, and
"way of life," like the invasion of privacy for the sake of prevention,
avoidance of skyscrapers, reduced travel and tourism, etc.). It is pre-
cisely because of the uncertainty that accompanies the terrorist threat,
and the associated costs, that few terrorists, armed with relatively
primitive means, can effectively threaten even the most powerful of
countries.14 Trajtenberg
Limited Deterrence
Two of the novel and most disturbing aspects of present-day terrorism
are the fact that the perpetrators are ready to commit suicide to fulfill
their mission and also the fact that some of their attacks are based on
suicide (as was the case for September 11, 2001). Indeed, there is a huge
difference between readiness to die for a cause but still hoping to get
away alive, and planning from the start to commit suicide in the course
of the attack and incorporating that plan as an integral and unavoid-
able part. Perhaps the most serious implication of the latter is that the
possibility of deterrence is greatly reduced, at least in the sense that
the perpetrators have nothing to fear for themselves. There still might
be some deterrence possible if, for example, the terrorists were based
in a sympathetic host country (as was the case with Afghanistan), and
hence the victim could retaliate against the host country, or if terrorists
had families or wider social networks in known places that could be
affected after the fact. However, after the war in Afghanistan, that sort
of deterrence seems to be less possible.
Limited deterrence implies that there is little use for offensive weap-
ons systems that in conventional confrontations would be perceived
by the potential attacker as posing an ex post threat. Thus, suicidal ter-
rorism almost completely neutralizes the initial advantage that ad-
vanced countries (the potential victims of terror) had in terms of
military might because such military capabilities are rendered ineffec-
tive by denying their deterrence value.
National Security: Still a Public Good?
National defense (or national security) has been traditionally regarded
as the prototypical type of public good.21 This is not just a definitional
matter but has far-reaching normative implications. Given the "pure"
public good nature of defense, economic logic dictates that govern-
ments should be in charge of supplying it and in fact should do so
exclusively. This provision of defense may be one of the main justifica-
tions for the very existence of a government, even in societies patterned
after strict market principles. Indeed, defense ranks higher as a public
good than, say, maintaining law and order because the latter could be
provided by local communities in a decentralized fashiOn (as has been
the case in many instances throughout history). For a given political
entity as a whole (e.g., nation, state), however, defense can hardly beCrafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 15
decentralized. Let me restate those aspects of a good or service that
make it public rather than private.22 First, public goods are said to be
nonrival in consumption; that is, the total amount of the good produced
can be "consumed" by each and every individual in society.By con-
trast, the total amount of a private good produced is divided among
consumers, so that if one consumes more, othersnecessarily consume
less. Second, agents providing a private good can prevent others from
gaining access to the good and consuming it (for example, excluding
those that refuse to pay for it), whereas there are no effective exclusion
mechanisms for public goods. It is hard or impossible to prevent any-
body that so desires from gaining access and enjoying the public good.
If one thinks of national defense as protection from foreign threats
that may in principle affect the country as a whole, it is clear that the
two attributes of public goods hold strictly for it: (1) nonrivalry(each
citizen enjoys thefull amount of defense produced), and (2) it is impos-
sible to exclude citizens who, say, don't pay taxes from enjoying the
protection from foreign threats offered by the defense capabilities sup-
plied in the country. As the discussion below indicates, however, the
nature of defense is much more complex in the context of the war
against terrorism.
As already mentioned, a key feature of terrorism is that the threat
is generalized (i.e., it can happen anywhere, anytime), and yet any par-
ticular attack is local because it entails striking at a particular location
that constitutes, even in the worse of cases, a small fraction of the coun-
try as a whole. Accordingly, confronting terrorism entails two very
different strategies. The first consists of fighting the terrorist threat at
its source, namely, intelligence gathering, pinpointing strikes at terror-
ist cells, denying bases in countries abroad, etc. The second strategy
entails deploying resources to protect likely targets in the homeland.
It is intuitively clear that the first strategy does retain the public
good nature of defense, whereas the second strategy makes the provi-
sion of defense mostly a local public good, even conveying negative
externalities.
Consider, for example, the threat of terrorist bombings against civil-
ian targets in the form of (local) public places that attract large numbers
of people, such as shopping malls or big office buildings. In the absence
of specific information on when and where the attack may take place,
protecting against such threat involves setting up some form of secu-
rity system at each such location. That security system may take the
form of security guards, checks on each person entering the facility,16 Trajtenberg
metal detectors, "sniffing" machines for luggage (which detect explo-
sives by the chemical fumes they generate), and so forth. Clearly, the
deployment of a security system of that sort at a specific potential target
location serves first and foremost those present at or otherwise associ-
ated with that location, thus making it a local public good. Increasing
security at one particular location may actually increase the risk to adja-
cent locations because terrorists are likely to prefer the least protected
targetthis is the negative externality mentioned above.23
In the case of airports, the issue is more complex, as was painfully
realized on September 11, 2001. Most of the victims were located far
away from the departure sites and had nothing to do with air travel.
In fact, securing airports serves a much wider purpose than just pro-
tecting those directly associated with them, and hence it is surely closer
to a public good. In the case of public utilities, the effects of a terrorist
attack may also be much wider in scope than those occurring at the
plant itself and its immediate surroundings. As these examples reveal,
there is actually a wide spectrum of possible cases, ranging from
strictly local targets to those that may serve just as entry points for
more generalized threats, to targets where attacks may have wide-
spread repercussions. I focus in the analysis on just the polar cases to
sharpen the issues at stake, but we should keep in mind that actual
threats may lie somewhere between.
These qualifications notwithstanding, terrorism has indeed caused
national security to become partly a private good. Therefore, the provi-
sion of defense is no longer strictly confined to the government but
has been to some extent privatized. Of course, security in general (e.g.,
protection from local crime such as theft, violence, sabotage, and indus-
trial espionage) has always been to some extent privately supplied, and
there is indeed a sizable cottage industry already in place that supplies
it. In that sense, the tension between the two strategies described above
may be seen as a replay of the tension that may exist in any urban
center between, say, preventive police action, on the one hand, and
placing private guards or security systems at specific locations, on the
other. Of course, huge differences exist between terrorism and tradi-
tional forms of crime. Those differences have to do primarily with the
relative magnitude of the threats, the underlying causes and ultimate
aims of each, and the national (and even cultural) significance of the
threats. These differences surely enhance the role of the government
in protection from terrorism versus traditional crime, and yet wide
margins exist for the private provision of security. Distributional con-Crafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 17
siderations for government intervention are surely morecompelling in
the case of terrorism.24
IV.Sketching a Model of Terrorism
I have developed elsewhere (Trajtenberg 2003) aformal model of ter-
rorism that allows one to analyze the various strategiesavailable for
confronting the threat of a terrorist attack, the incentives to investin
each by private parties and by the government, R&D aimed atimprov-
ing the effectiveness of these strategies, etc.25 Following asketchy de-
scription of the building blocks of the model, I present someof the
inferences that can be drawn from it and that are of particular relevance
for R&D policy.
The model starts by analyzing the behavior of the three partiesin-
volved in the "game" of terrorism: (1) the terrorists, whose aim is to
inflict damage to potential targets, and hence their "utility" is apositive
function of the losses suffered by their victims; (2) the potential targets,
who, without terrorism, would go about their business as usualand
receive a certain payoff (e.g., profits, rents), but under thethreat of
terrorism have to factor in the risk of being hit, losing thepayoff, and
incurring a further loss; and (3) the government,which is interested
in minimizing the expected losses from possible terroristattacks. The
cornerstone of the model is the decision-makingproblem facing the
terrorists: they have to decide whether or not to strike, and ifthey do,
then which target to hit. This decision generates a set ofprobabilities
over those possible actions. Potential targets canaffect those probabili-
ties through decisions about how much to invest intheir own security.
Finally, the government decides how much to invest in fighting terror-
ism at its source, taking into account the behavior ofthe other parties.
The decision of terrorists can be represented by a decision tree, as
shown in figure 1.2.
As mentioned in the preceding section, two basic strategies canbe
used to confront the terrorist threat: (1) fight terrorism at its source,
which means in this context undertaking activities that decreasethe
probability p that an attack will take place (I shall refer to it asthe
"S-strategy," "5" for source); and (2) protect particular targets,thus
reducing the probability t1 that they will be hit if the terroristsdecide
to strike (the "L-strategy," "L" for local). Notsurprisingly, the analysis
shows that it is highly unlikely that private parties (i.e.,individual tar-
gets) would be willing to contribute voluntarily to the S-strategy,andNot Strike
Probability (l-p)
N potential targets, each may
experience losses of L if struck
Figure 1.2
The terrorist decision tree.
hence that role is typically left to the government. On the other hand,
it is quite likely that each potential target will have enough incentives
to spend on the L-strategy, which will happen when the expected losses
of each target, the probability that terrorists will strike, and/or the ef-
fectiveness of private security spending are sufficiently large (ina sense
made precise in the model). The provision of security against terror
then takes a dual nature: a public good, on the one hand (i.e., reducing
the likeithood of a strike by fighting terror at its source), which is the
traditional case, and a quasi-private good, namely, each potential target
pays for its own security.
The dual nature of anti-terrorist investments reflects itself also in the
two types of externalities that spending on local security generates. The
first is zero-sum; conditional on a strike taking place, an extra dollar
spent by a particular target on the L-strategy decreases the probability
of a strike against that target, and thereby it necessarily increases the
probability of other potential targets being bit. That is, enhancing the
security of a particular target confers a negative externalityon all other
potential targets. On the other hand, an extra dollar spent on one'sown
security has some deterrence effect because it lowers the probability
that terrorists will choose to strike and hence confersa positive exter-
nality. Thus, enhanced security at any particu'ar target reduces the at-
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an attack for everybody. The model showsthat, on the whole, the exter-
nalities generated by extra spending on own security ofparticular tar-
gets are negative; that is, the net impact of enhancingthe security of
a particular target is to increasethe risk faced by others.
The two alternative strategies (S versus L) differ greatly also in their
relative effectiveness. The per-dollar benefits to society of devoting re-
sources to fighting terrorism at the source,which constitutes a public
good, are much larger than those derived from enhancing the security
of individual targets, measured in terms of the reduction in the proba-
bility of a terrorist strike. In fact, it can be shown that the difference is
on the order of N, the number of potential targets;i.e., the S-strategy
is about N times as effective as the L-strategy.26 This finding ishardly
surprising, but the magnitude of the difference is sobering.
These inferences provide the background for one of the key ques-
tions that arise in this context: how much should the governmentinvest
in the S-strategy, assuming that its goal is to minimize theexpected
value of losses from a terrorist attack, and taking into account the be-
havior of the other parties to the game (i.e., the optimizing behavior
of terrorists, on the one hand, and of potential targets, on theother)?
The model provides a clear answer: the government shouldspend on fight-
ing terrorism at its source as much as it takes to induce private targets to
spend nothing on local security.27 Recall that spending on the S-strategy
reduces p. the prabability that a terrorist strike will take place. Thus,
the optimal rule is that the government should decrease p (viaexpendi-
tures on the S-strategy) to the point where individual targetsfind it
too costly to invest in their own (local) security.28
Ideally then, we should see large amounts of resources being spent
on intelligence and related S-strategy activities,and none on the L-
strategy. In practice, though, we see large and increasingamounts
being spent on local security. That may be so for two reasons:(1) the
govenment does not spend enough on the S-strategy, and (2)individ-
ual targets overestimate the probabilities that they will be hit or other-
wise attach additional psychological benefits to local security that go
beyond the stark logic of our models.29 Additional research is needed
to elucidate these issues.
Finally, the model can also be deployed to explore the relative effi-
ciency of R&D aimed at either strategy, which can be thought ofin the
present context as innovative activity aimed at increasing theeffective-
ness of spending on security. That is,R&D in the context of the
S-strategy is seen as increasing the extent to which investments in20 Trajtenberg
fighting terrorism at its source reduce the probability ofa strike, and
similarly, R&D in the context of the L-strategy increases the extent
to which spending on local security reduces the probability ofpar-
ticular targets being hit. The analysis shows that R&D devoted to the
S-strategy is likely to be much more effective than R&D aimed at
the L-strategy, provided only that total expenditureson fighting terror-
ism at the source are larger than the average expenditureon one's own
security by individual targets, which is surely the case.
V. R&D to Fight TerrorismPolicy Implications
The dual nature of defense in the context of the war against terrorism
also figures in the allocation of resources to R&D: should thegovern-
ment engage in and/or pay for R&D aimed at improving themeans
available both to fight terror at its source and to protect the population
from its consequences? First, we know thateven in the context of
purely private goods, a market economy may well underinvest in
R&D. The fact that R&D generates spillovers implies that the social
rate of return is typically higher than the private return, and hence that
private investment in R&D may fall short of the socially desirable level.
Thus, even if providing security from terrorismwas deemed to be en-
tirely a private good, there would be room for government support for
anti-terrorism-related R&D, for example in the context of the advanced
technology program (ATP).
As we have seen, though, there is a component of the fight against
terror that clearly has a public good nature, which is the one associated
with the S-strategy, that is, security outlays aimed at diminishingp,
the likelihood of a terrorist strike. This involves locating, monitoring,
and intercepting terrorist cells around the world; disrupting their logis-
tical and financial base; limiting their access and mobility; andso forth,
so that the ability or readiness of terrorists to carry out attacks are im-
paired as much as possible. Therefore, R&D aimed at enhancing the
effectiveness of these outlays should be the government's responsibil-
ity, much as the provision of traditional national securityrelated
R&D has always been.3° One of the key aspects of the S-strategy is
intelligence, that is, the gathering of informationon terrorists (master-
minds, operatives, and supporters), their modes of operation and
sources and channels of finance, and (above all) as much detail as possi-
ble on their future plans. As noted in Section III, one of the distinguish-
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of it, that is, the fact that there is a great deal of inherentuncertainty
regarding where and when terrorists will strike.Intelligence broadly
means the reduction of suchuncertainty. It conveys vast, generalized
benefits, and therefore it is the crucial tool and thepre-eminent public
good in the context of the fight against terror. R&Daimed at providing
better intelligence capabilities has therefore veryhigh social payoffs,
suggesting that it should be made the cornerstoneof R&D policy in
the war against terrorism.
In terms of R&D aimed at the L-strategy, there maybe a role for the
government, even though it is quite likely thatlocal security would be
provided privately because, as already mentioned, themarket may still
underinvest in R&D for the usual reasons.31 Furthermore,there is cer-
tainly a role for the government in promoting basicresearch that feeds
into down-the-line R&D aimed at enhancinglocal security, much as it
does for most basic research in almost all areasof science and technol-
ogy. Since Arrow (1962), it iswell understood that basic research gener-
ates the most spillovers, the benefitsfrom it are inherently very hard
to appropriate, and hence it is up tothe government to promote and
subsidize it.
There are two additional areas that also callfor a government role:
R&D aimed at protecting from nonconventionalterrorist threats (see
appendix 1.3) and R&D for improved cyber security.The former differs
from a conventional terrorist threat obviously in the scopeof the poten-
tial damage, making them "macro" threats and thusturning the provi-
sion of security against them into a classic publicgood, with the usual
implications. With the proliferation of Internet-based orinterconnected
computerized infrastructure systems, threats at computerand commu-
nications networks have acquired once again a"macro" dimension
(again, because of the scope and reach of the damagethat may be in-
flicted), and therefore it is up to the government toplay a key role in
confronting these threats, particularly in the conductof R&D.
Beyond R&D in purely technological fields, research inthe behav-
ioral and social sciences may also play a significantrole in confronting
terrorism: first, in understanding the motivations,the psychological
makeup, and the wider sociological context of terrorists, aswell as con-
tributing cultural, political, and economic factors;and second, in deal-
ing with the psychological and socioeconomiceffects of the terrorist
threat on the targeted population, includingthe perception of prob-
abilities, which influences in turn the incentives toinvest in local
security.22 Trajtenberg
VI.Defense R&D: Technological Directions and Market
Competition
Both intelligence and protection of potential targets require the devel-
opment of sensory computer interfaces that can be used for detection
and intelligence gathering. As the analysis abovesuggests, increasing
detection capabilities (in the broad sense) should beone of the main
goals of defense R&D. The protection of targetsas well as the identi-
fication of suspects requires enhanced ability to detectweapons, ex-
plosives, bacteriological materials, and other potentially dangerous
devices being carried by individuals, shippedover different means of
transportation, stored in hidden places, etc. It also requires positive
identification of individuals, both suspects and those with legitimate
access permits to designated places.
These screening and detection capabilities should allow for the fast
and reliable screening of people, containers, and luggage with minimal
disruption to economic activity, travel, and privacy. This isa tall order,
considering the staggering number of people moving dailythrough
airports and other transport modes and entering big office buildings,
government offices, and infrastructure facilities, and the number of
containers shipped, parcels mailed, and so forth. Another set ofcapa-
bilities that need to be enhanced are those related to eavesdropping
and interception of all sorts of communications, ranging fromthose
taking place over regular phone lines anywhere in the worldto convér-
sations inside caves in eastern Afghanistanor in underground parking
lots in New York.
The common denominator of this vast array of required capabilities
is that one needs to be able to emulate humansenses (to "hear," to
"see" and "recognize," to "smell," to "touch and feel") in automated,
computerized ways. That is, one needs to create smart,sensory inter-
faces between computerized detection systems and the physicalworld
that will be able to activate those senses in fast, reliableways as a matter
of routine.32 I emphasize this required change in the direction oftechni-
cal change (i.e., emulating humansensory perceptions) because in fact
computer technology has developed historically in a very asymmetric,
skewed way vis-à-vis human capabilities. It sought relentlesslyto im-
prove the "brain" (i.e., the central processor), while keeping a primitive
sensory interface. Call it the "Helen Keller model" of computer technol-
ogy: virtually deaf, dumb, blind (and lacking also sense of touchor
smell), but highly intelligent (i.e., capable of performingenormousCrafting Defense R&D Policyin the Anti-Terrorist Era 23
amounts of routinecomputations). This developmenthas been, on re-
flection, a very peculiarpath of technological progress,dictated in part
by the constraints ofscientific knowledge but alsoby the predominant
type of uses for computers.
There is, however,increased recognition thatdeveloping computer-
ized sensory interfaces isextremely important for awide and rapidly
expanding array of civilian uses,ranging from automobiles (e.g.,voice-
activated computerizedcommands, improved safetytechnologies, pre-
ventive maintenance, etc.) tomedicine and consumerappliances and
gadgetry. Developmentof computerized sensoryinterfaces is in fact
one of thetechnological frontiers attracting agreat deal of attention,
both in basic and appliedresearch. Thus, defense R&Ddevoted to this
area is very likely tohave immediate, direct spilloversto civilian uses.
Presumably, there have beenspillovers from "traditional"defense
R&D all along (even if thesespillovers are hard to quantify).The differ-
ence is that, inthis case, the technologicalfrontier that defense (anti-
terror) R&D is supposed tobreach is the same as thatrequired for
progress in civilian uses.That is not the case with, say,improvements
in nuclear weapons orin stealth technology. Inthese cases, the gradient
of technological advancein military R&D has nodirect relevance for
civilian purposes, and thespillovers, if any, are onlyindirect.
Another area that calls forincreased R&D resources isfast analysis
of vast amounts of information(referred to as "fusion"), as best exem-
plified by the need to reviewstaggering amounts of voice,data, and
email messages interceptedby the National SecurityAdministration
(NSA) and other agencies.It would seem that the rateof growth of
communications (i.e., the amountof messages beingtransmitted over
an expanding rangeof modes: fixed line andcellular phones, satellites,
the various wireless modes,fax and email) is at least asfast if not faster
than the rate of improvementin computer capabilitiesaimed at analyz-
ing them. Thus, to shortensubstantially the delays inreviewing these
communications (which have provencritical for the ability toidentify
terrorist threats in real time),the technologies in questionwould have
to undergo significantbreakthroughs. Again, thisgradient of techno-
logical progress fits alsowell-defined civilian needs, forexample, in
terms of the dataanalysis requirementsassociated with the genome
project and its aftermath(and even more so thecorresponding program
for mapping proteins) or moregenerally "data mining" inbusinesses
that have become anincreasingly important activityin a wide range
of sectors.24
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What is required then is thesetting up of R&Dprograms that would
support mainly the development ofsensory computer interfaces for
detection and intelligencegathering and of computertechnologies for
massive data analysis. As alreadymentioned, the systems soughtare, for the most part, "dualuse" in the sense that they haveboth defense
and civilian applications.33 Thisis very different from ColdWar defense
R&D, which was aimed primarilyat big weapons systems. Asfor the
overall budget for defense R&D,the point emphasized hereis the inter-
nal reallocation required,away from big weapons systems andtoward the new programs. Itremains to be seen how thetotal would be affected.
The different nature of thenew defense R&D may have profound
implications for the industrialorganization aspects of thesectors in-
volved. The development of bigweapons systems in the decades of
the Cold War led toa high concentration of both R&D andprocurement in a few large corporations,thus conferringon them a great deal of
market and bargainingpower. It is quite likely that thiscourse had
detrimental effects in terms ofcosts and efficiency, and itmay have
steered technical advance intoquestionable directions (suchas with the extremely expensivestealth technology). Bycontrast, the develop-
ment of sensory computer interfaces,computer technologies formas- sive data analysis, Internetsecurity, biological protection,and the like, entails an entirely differentplaying field. Thesesystems are by and
large dual use; a private marketexists for many of the productssought;
and already a vast number ofplayers work in the high-tech,computer,
and biotech sectors thatcan partake in this new R&D, and itcan attract
new entrants. R&D programs designedto preserve this diversityand to encourage furthercompetition may prove highly beneficialboth for the required defense R&Dand for the advancedsectors of the economy
themselves, thus fosteringeconomic growth.
VII.Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of thethreats facing the UnitedStates in the
wake of September 11, 2001,suggests the articulation ofa coherent
defense R&D policy basedon the following set of principles:
1. It is no longer clearwhether it is still justifiedto devote large
amounts of R&D to the developmentof costly big weaponssystems,
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sues; carriers; etc. Gradualupgrades of existing systems andbasic re-
search for future generationsof these systems may suffice.The
resources thus savedcould be reallocated to thedevelopment of intelli-
gence and anti-terroristmeans.
The war against terrorisminvolves two main aspects:fighting ter-
rorists at their source (theS-strategy) and protectingpotential targets
(the L-strategy). The formeris a pre-eminent publicgood and hence
should be supplied by thegovernments whereas the latteris typically
a private or alocal public good that carriesnegative externalities and
is far less efficient thanfighting terrorism at the source.Formal analysis
indicates that the governmentshould devote enough resources tothe
S-strategy to dissuadepotential targets from spending ontheir own
security, at least when the costsof financing such spending arelinear.
The different nature ofeach strategy dictates also thekind of R&D
needed.
Resources devoted to theS-strategy involve monitoringand inter-
cepting terrorist cellsaround the world, disruptingtheir logistical and
financial base, and limiting their accessand mobility to impair their
ability to carry out attacks(i.e., decreases in p). Thisinvolves first and
foremost intelligence activitiesin their broadest sense,suggesting that
the most important goalof defense R&D should be toprovide ad-
vanced technological means andthus enhance the intelligencecapabili-
ties of the various U.S.agencies in charge (primarilythe CIA and the
NSA) and of the supportingmilitary forces.
Protecting potential targets is amixed public-private good and, ac-
cordingly, the private sector islikely to provide some of therequired
security. If they do so, privatefirms will also have incentives toconduct
R&D aimed at developing moreeffective means to providelocal secu-
rity. However, that incentive maynot be strong enoughfor the usual
reasons; moreover,the conduct of the requiredbasic R&D necessitates
government support, as isthe case in almost all realmsof science and
technology.
R&D aimed at protecting fromnonconventional terrorist threatsand
R&D for cyber securityalso call for an active governmentrole. The
former constitutes "macro"threats; therefore, the provisionof secu-
rity against those threats canbe seen as a classic publicgood, with the
usual implications. With theproliferation of interconnected computer-
ized infrastructure systems,threats at computer andcommunications26
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networks have also acquireda "macro" dimension, and thereforeit is
up to the government to play a leading role,particularly in the conduct
of R&D, in confronting them.There is also room toencourage research
in the behavioral and socialsciences, with the aim ofunderstanding both the enemy and theeffects of the terrorist threaton the targeted
population.
Notes
Prepared for the conferenceon Innovation Policy and the Economy, Washington,April 15, 2003. 1 am thankful to AlonEisenberg and Marina Tsirulnik forexcellent research
assistantship; to Guy Kaplan for offering hismifitary expertise; and to Jacob Glazer,Dan Peled, Oren Setter, and NadineBaudot-Trajtenberg for usefulcomments.
At the beginning of the Cold War,the share of GDP devoted to R&Dwas just 1.4 percent (in 1953). It rose rapidly during the late1950s to over 2 percent, and it has fluctu-
ated since within the 2.3 to 2.9percent range. See the National ScienceFoundation report at
For an overview of the economicsof defense R&D, see Lichteriberg(1995).
A further goal was containment of theSoviet influence around the world,but it is less clear how that goal influenceddefense R&D.
See, for example, the various treatiesrestricting the development, testing,and/or de- ployment of various weapons systems,such as antiballistic missiles (ABMs).
For example, in the early 1980s,a full 75 percent of federal outlayson defense R&D went to missiles and aircraft, two of themain items in the category of "bigweapons systems" (see Mowery and Rosenberg 1989).
Hence the lack at present of effectivedefensive systems for the missilethreats posed by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.The Patriot system did not performwell during the 1991 Gulf War, and it remains to beseen if the newly developed Israeli Arrowsystem or the improved Patriot will do better.
I refer here just to the technologicalcapabilities as manifested in the qualityand effec- tiveness of the weapons systems, andnot to the military stock, that is, the actualquantity of weapons (and manpower) available
R&D (or "knowledge") stock isa widely used concept (see, e.g., Griiches1984), paral- leling that of physical capital stock,and can be computed simply byaccumulating lagged R&D expenditures and assuminga given depreciation rate, usually significantlyhigher than that for physical capital. It isnot clear what rate would be appropriatefor comput- ing a defense R&D stock; presumablyit varies inter alia with the intensityof the arms race. Here, I use a depreciation rate of 15percent (which has become a sort of focalfigure in this type of computation), but Icompute the stocks also for a 5 percentrate to gain an idea of the range of uncertainty in thatrespect.
Note that Russia's GDP is atpresent just about 1/40 that of the UnitedStates.
Thus, we exclude Canada and Italy.Crafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-TerroristEra 27
One can argue that R&D costs in China aresignificantly lower than in the United
States, and hence matching the real amount of resourcesallocated by the United States
to defense R&D would entail significantly lessthan that. However, even if R&D costs
were half as high in China, that would stillentail allocating 2 percent of GDP to military
R&D, again a staggering amount. To put that figure inperspective, notice that the share
of China's GDP devoted to total military expenditures was1.4 percent in 2001 according
to official Chinese figures, or 2.1 percentaccording to SIPRI (2002).
We sorted the items by the allocated budget andexamined the items from the top
down. Thus, although we classified only about 50 percentof the items, they account for
about 90 percent of the total budget.
Not all of it is related to anti-terrorism, but we could notmake that distinction.
There is only one item that explicitly mentions the war onterrorism. "Combating
Terrorism Technology Support," Office of the Secretaryof Defense, allocated just $49
million in 2003.
As David Gold writes in SIPRI (2002), "The F-22 ... wasdesigned during the cold
war to counter an expected new generationof Soviet aircraft and air defenses that never
materialized. The F-15, which the F-22 will replace, gives theUSA air superiority over
any conceivable enemy well into thefuture. Thus, the F-22 may be a system without a
threat to combat......Estimates predict that a fullyequipped plane will cost well above
$100 million.
Still, in nominal dollar terms, inteffigence and anti-terroristR&D increased by over
50 percent from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2003.
It is also very different than previous instancesof terrorism, particularly because
most terrorist organizations operated locally (withintheir own countries), and they had
as goals igniting some sort of drasticinternal political change.
We follow Arrow (1962) in the sense that the roleof R&D and of government policy
in this regard should follow from an understanding ofthe nature of the "good" in ques-
tion. Arrow dissected the nature of knowledgeand of knowledge creation, whereas here
we are trying to understand thepeculiarities of the war against terror as opposed to
conventional warfare, and derive from it the contours of anappropriate defense R&D
policy.
Consider, for example, what it would have taken to preventSeptember 11, 2001, had
the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) known inadvance of the plan: a score of arrests
in several locations, conducted by a few hundred agentsatrivial operation relative to
the magnitude of the threat.
We do not deny, of course, the role of surprise.When poised to launch the offensive
on the Nazis, the Allies invested greatefforts in deception, that is, in creating uncertainty
about where and when D-Day would take place. Yet itis hard to imagine that any out-
come of significance for the war depended onthe success of the deception campaign.
See, for example, Gold (1999) for a discussion ofdefense as a public good in the
international context.
Tn addition, the provision of some public andquasi-public goods entails indivisibili-
ties, that is, minimal large-size investments in production,like that with mass transport,
dams, etc.28 Trajtenberg
But there may also be positive externalities, as in any other securitycontext. See, for
example, Ayres and Levitt (1998).
Distributional considerations refer to the fact that public places cateringto low-
income segments of the population may invest little in security, and thus theybecome
more likely targets. Such an outcome may be perceived as unfair, however, like denying
medical care to those unable to pay for it.
For antecedents to this type of modeling, see Enders and Sandier (1995).
To recall, N stands for the number of potential targets, and hence itmay be very
large indeed (tens of thousands? hundreds of thousands?).
This result refers to the case where the costs of financing the S-strategyare linear,
that is, when each additional dollar "costs" the same regardless of howmuch one spends.
However, if it gets increasingly costly to finance spendingon the S-strategy (for example,
if the government has to resort to more distortionary taxesor to borrowing at increas-
ingly higher interest rates), then one may obtain a solution by which theoptimal spend-
ing on the S-strategy stops short of nullifying the incentives of potentialtargets to spend
on the L-strategy.
Note that in the classic case of a public good (such as national defense),the govern-
ment has to supply it because there are no private incentives to doso (at least not in the
required quantities). By contrast, in the present case thegovernment has to allocate
enough resources to the public good to prevent private agents fromspending on local
security because such spending is highly inefficient.
In addition to the qualification set forth in footnote 27, itmay be that increasing costs
of financing at the margin effectively cap spending on the S-strategyat levels that stifi
leave room for private spending on the L-strategy. This isa rather unlikely scenario,
however, in view of the fact that spending on S-strategy-related activitiesconstitutes a
very small fraction of the federal budget.
As with traditional national security, that does not necessarilymean R&D should
be performed by government agencies, nor that the government shouldnecessarily pay
for all or most of the R&D costs. As long as the government commitsto purchasing the
security products that result from the R&D, private suppliersmay share the R&D costs
and the associated risks.
This is true in spite of the fact that, as mentioned in Section 117, the levelof spending
in local security should be zero, provided that thegovernment spends enough on the
S-strategy.
See for example Appendix 1.3: "A collaborative effort... will investigate the reliable
identification of specific individuals, even when attempts have beenmade to alter ap-
pearance, by measuring the "biometric" signatures of people passing through, forexam-
ple airports. The effort will range from development of surveillancesensors to algorithms
that interpret their data and automatically alert operatorsto potentially dangerous
people."
See Cowan and Foray (1995), Lerner (1992), and Molas-Gallart (1997).
As R&D progresses from basic research toward development, thecosts normally
increase rapidly, and hence restricting R&D to themore basic stages would save large
amounts of resources.Crafting Defense R&D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era 29
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Appendix 1.3: OSTP, Fiscal Year 2003 R&D Budget Documents-
Anti-Terrorism S&T
The President is committed to leveragingthe capabilities of our na-
tion's scientific and engineering communities incountering new
threats to our homeland and our national security.The President's 2003
Budget represents an escalation in theAdministration's strong support
for research and development aimed at defeatingthese dangers to our
way of life. Research anddevelopment funding for homeland security
and combating terrorism (including protectingcritical infrastructure)
will rise from nearly $1 billion in 2002 to anestimated $3 billion in
2003. These funds will be used to develop new orimproved capabilities
for protecting our nation from terrorism and its consequences.Some
examples are provided below.
Confronting Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Office of Homeland Security hascoordinated a major multi-agency
research effort that will lead to improved techniquesfor timely detec-
tion of biological attacks on our nation, andfor minimizing the conse-
quences of an attack. In the Departmentof Health and Human Services
and Department of Defense (DOD), funding forbioterrorism R&D is
increased from a pre-9/11 level of just over $300million to more than
$2.4 billionmore than a factor of seven increase.$1.75 billion is pro-
vided to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) toperform fundamen-
tal research leading to the development ofrapid identification and
monitoring technologies, diagnostic tests, new vaccinesand therapeu-
tics, including an improved anthrax vaccine. Anadditional $49 million
would be provided to the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) for
research and drug approval. Aside from a varietyof other research
activities, the DOD will dedicate $420million to ensure rapid detection
of biological agents, devise countermeasures, and tostudy and model
the technology and tactics of bioterrorists. TheEnvironmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) will receive $75 million todevelop improved tech-
niques and procedures for coping withbiological and chemical
incidents. Additionally, investments are being made toenhance the
nation's capability for detecting the use of chemicaland radiological
weapons. The Department ofEnergy (DOE), for example, will demon-
strate a multi-station prototype of achemical agent detection and re-
sponse system in the Washington,D.C., Metro system.34 Trajtenberg
Detecting Potential Danger
A collaborative effort between the Department of Justice, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, the National Institute of Standards andTech-
nology (NIST), and DOE will investigate the reliable identificationof
specific individuals, even when attempts have been madeto alter ap-
pearance, by measuring the "biometric" signatures of people passing
through, for example, airports. The effort willrange from development
of surveillance sensors to algorithms that interpret their data andauto-
matically alert operators to potentially dangerous people.
Explosives Detection
The Federal Aviation Administration, DOE, and the TechnicalSupport
Working Group (jointly sponsored by the State Department and DOD)
will research improved methods for detecting conventionalexplosives
in luggage, in airports and other transportation portals,at the borders,
and in high population density areas.
Setting Standards
There will be a coordinated multi-agency effort for setting appropriate
standards in homeland security; these agencies include NIST, EPA,the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the NuclearRegula-
tory Commission. Areas of focus will include setting standards for
equipment used by first responders, and setting decontamination
thresholds for determining when an area can be reoccupied afteran
attack.
Basic Research
Fundamental investigative efforts will be funded at severalagencies
to provide basic scientific data for the war against terrorism. These
efforts include $27 million for fundamental work at theNational Sci-
ence Foundation for sequencing the genomes of pathogens,so that
more effective detection schemes and defenses might be developed,
and work at NIH on developing candidate products that could become
the next generation of vaccines.
Source: U.S. Government (2003b).